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CONSIDERING OUR POSITION: VIEWING INFORMATION
WARFARE AS A USE OF FORCE PROHIBITED BY ARTICLE 2(4)
OF THE U.N. CHARTER
Todd A. Morth"
This is Radio Clash
Stealing all transmissions
Beaming from the mountaintop
Using aural ammunition
With extreme prejudice
On a terminator mission
This is Radio Clash
Consider your position.'
I. INTRODUCTION
INFORMATION WARFARE IS AN EMERGING THREAT
TECHNOLOGY HAS RAPIDLY ADVANCED from the radios that the
popular singing group The Clash sang about in 1981, as the world's most
advanced countries enter into what has been termed the "information
age."2 This new epoch is defimed by the use of computers, particularly
computers grouped into the "network form 3 - computers used to facili-
tate human interactions.4 These information networks have led to numer-
ous advances in the quality of life by improving the provision of vital
services such as power, medicine, and public safety 5
However, dependence on information networks also places those
J.D. Candidate, Case Western Reserve University School of Law, 1998.
THE CLASH, Radio Clash, on THIs IS RADIO CLASH, (Epic Records, 1981).
2 See ALviN ToFRLER & HEmI TOF.ER, WAR AND ANT-WAR 19 (1993) (discuss-
ing what they view as the "Third Wave" of civilization).
3 See JoHN ARQUILLA & DAVID RONFELDT, THE ADVENT OF NET WAR 33-35
(1996) (explaining that the "network form" involves large-scale use of interconnected
groups of information storage and retrieval technologies such as computers).
4 See i.
See Security in Cyberspace: Hearings Before the Permanent Subcomm. on
Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Gov't. Affairs, 104th Cong. 150, 155 (1996)
[hereinafter Security in Cyberspace] (testimony of Jamie S. Gorelick, Deputy Attorney
General) (describing how technology generally, and information networks specifically,
play critical roles in the functioning and development of these important areas).
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countries reliant upon them in a position of vulnerability.' If vital infor-
mation networks stopped functioning, an information age society would
be paralyzed and could quickly collapse into chaos.7 Attacks on informa-
tion networks, or information warfare (IW), could inflict damage rivalled
only by other weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear or chemical
weapons.' A concerted IW attack could devastate a modem society by
crippling the information networks crucial to providing power, transporta-
tion, national defense, and medical services.9 The destructive capability
of IW presents a significant threat to the international community and
creates a need for consideration of a mechanism to respond to 1W attacks.
Information warfare is especially troublesome for the international
community because relative to chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons,
the technology required to attack information networks is simple to
acquire.' Information networks can also be sabotaged via the manufac-
6 See David C. Gompert, Keeping Information Warfare in Perspective <http:ll
www.rand.org/publicationsfRRR/RRR.fa195.cyber/perspective.htnl> (visited Mar. 5, 1997)
(explaining that the U.S. dependency on information networks has grown much faster
than our understanding of the vulnerabilities this dependence causes).
7 See WINN SCHWARTAU, INFORMATION WARFARE: CHAOS ON THE ELECTRONIC
SUPERHIGHWAY 308-10 (1994) (describing how a concerted attack against critical finan-
cial and communication networks could result in widespread panic and lead to a
situation resembling anarchy).
' See Paul Mann, Cyber-Threat Expands With Unchecked Speed, AVIATION WK. &
SPACE TECH., July 8, 1996, at 63, 64 (reporting that CIA Director, John Deutch, ranks
threats of information warfare as "a close third behind the threats from weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) and the proliferation and terrorist use of nuclear, biological,
and chemical ...weapons). See also Walter Laqueur, Postmodern Terrorism, FOREIGN
AFF., Sept.-Oct. 1996, at 9 (claiming information warfare will be more destructive than
either chemical or biological weapons); Bruce Smith, An Eye for An Eye, A Byte for
A Byte, 42 FED. LAW., Oct. 1995, 12, 12-13 (speculating that information warfare
might be more effective than nuclear weaponry). But see Larry Seaquist, The Ten-Foot-
Tall Electron: Finding Security in the Web, in THE INFORMATION REVOLUTION AND
NATIONAL SEcuRrrY 68, 75 (Stuart J.D. Schwartzstein ed., 1996) (arguing that history
proves that societies have the resiliency to survive any impacts that information warfare
might cause and that comparisons between IW and nuclear and chemical warfare are
unjustified).
9 See infra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
10 See SCHWARTAU, supra note 7, at 308-10. All that would be needed to conduct
extensive information warfare would be a bank of high-powered computers and modems
and people with the requisite expertise to use them. See id. Moreover, with the end of
the "Cold War," the United States and the international community have eased consid-
erably their restrictions on the export of computers and other information technology.
U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, INFORMATION SECURITY AND
PRIVACY IN NETWORK ENVIRONMENTS, OTA-TCT-606, 154-55 (Sept. 1994).
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ture of purposely defective equipment and, given the wide manufacturing
base for computers, there exists significant opportunity for such sabotage
to occur." The current state of international politics, with the demise of
the Soviet Union as a superpower and the United Nations coalition
victory in the 1991 Gulf War, has created a situation where non-conven-
tional means, such as terrorism or information warfare, offer the best
mechanism to attack the advanced "Western" countries." This makes
non-conventional attack methods such as destroying information networks
attractive to those who have interests adverse to those of the United
States and its allies.' At least twelve countries have started to develop
the capability to conduct attacks on information networks. Twenty-six
other countries might be developing this capability. 4
The United States and several European countries have recognized
the potential threat posed by IW and are developing their own 1W
capabilities in answer to the threat. 5
These countries are also attempting to establish national legal
mechanisms to respond to IW. 6 However, the unilateral attempts by
these countries to control IW have caused them to overlook critical
aspects of it and other mechanisms to control this kind of warfare.17 The
U.N. system of dispute resolution by the Security Council and the
International Court of Justice offers a mechanism to control 1W."g An
" See SCHWARTAU, supra note 7, at 165 (1994) (noting that computer chips for
U.S. and Japanese computers are manufactured throughout the Pacific Rim).
" See International Terrorism: Hearing Before the Senate Select Comm. on
Intelligence, 104th Cong. (1996) [hereinafter International Terrorism] (testimony of
James Schlesinger, Former Secretary of Defense, arguing that the break-up of the Soviet
Union and the Warsaw Pact caused the dissolution of the only military force capable
of challenging the advanced "Western" countries on a global scale. The Gulf War
indicated the superiority of U.S. and European military forces over regional powers
such as Iraq).
3 See id.; see also R. James Woolsey, Resilience and Vulnerability in the Informa-
tion Age, in TmE INFORMATION REVOLUTION AND NATIONAL SEcURIrrY 79, 82-83
(Stuart 3. D. Schwartzstein ed., 1996) (describing incentives rogue states and terrorist
groups have to engage in information warfare).
14 See John Donnelly, Intel Report: Dirty Dozen Nations are Industrial Spies,
DEFENSE WK., July 1, 1996, available in 1996 WL 7978531.
" See J. Knowles, /W Battlelab to Go Operational This Month, J. OF ELEC. DEF.,
June 1, 1997 (describing how the Air Force is now conducting intensive studies of
both offensive and defensive information warfare).
26 See infra notes 55-64 and accompanying text.
, See infra notes 115-27 and accompany text.
28 See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 58-59 (4th ed.
1990) (explaining capacities necessary for the right to bring an international claim).
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exploration of this mechanism will allow the international community to
plan more effectively its response to IW. The U.N. dispute resolution
mechanism also offers the advantage of already being in place, while
other mechanisms have not yet been formulated, much less implemented.
This Note considers whether the international community should view
IW as a prohibited use of force under Article 2(4) of the United Nations
Charter. Article 2(4) of the Charter proscribes the use of force to resolve
international disputes. 9 Part I focuses on creating a clear definition of
IW. This process involves defining IW and then contrasting it as defined
with similar, yet different activities. Part II explains why the transnational
nature of IW requires the international community to recognize and
respond to AW. Part I examines whether Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter
is an appropriate mechanism to respond to IW. This analysis requires an
explanation of the concept of force contained in Article 2(4). This section
then explains how IW meets the criteria required for it to be considered
a use of force under Article 2(4). Finally, Part IV argues that IW consti-
tutes a prohibited use of force under Article 2(4). This Note concludes by
explaining why the United Nations should take the position that IW is a
violation of Article 2(4).
H. INFORMATION WARFARE: DEFINING THE PROBLEM
It would be futile to analyze IW without a sufficiently clear and
narrow definition of the term. Without a clear definition, too many
activities become entangled in the concept, and the term will overwhelm
any legal regime. Numerous conceptions and formulations of IW have
been put forward.2 Many of these definitions conflict with the views of
the international community regarding what violates international law.2'
This section addresses this concern by offering a definition of IW which
is compatible with international law. The posited definition will be
clarified by comparing and contrasting IW with similar activities with
which it may be confused.
"' "All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." U.N. CHARTER Art.
2, para. 4.
' See infra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
21 See infra note 88 and accompany text.
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A. An Operational Definition of Information Warfare
For purposes of this Note, IW will be defined as state activity'
which has an incapacitating' effect on the ability of the owners of
any information network to use or manage that network.' This includes,
but is not limited to telecommunications, electrical power systems, gas
and oil storage, transportation, banking and finance, military forces, and
emergency services including medical, police, fire and rescue, to use or
manage that network. This definition narrows the issue by focusing
only on actions engaged in by states. However, the definition also in-
cludes a large variety of activities,: as many different methods can be
used to attack information networks. A brief overview of these activities
will create a better understanding of what the definition of IW encom-
passes.
Several distinct ways exist to incapacitate information networks
including physical destruction of the network, corruption of the hardware
or software the network uses, and inundating the network with so many
requests that it effectively shuts down. The physical destruction of a net-
work represents the one form of 1W that international law has no diffi-
' See BROWNLE, supra note 18, at 58-59. Brownlie notes that international law
concerns itself primarily with states. See id. at 59.
' "Incapacity" is defined as a "lack of adequate power." See BLACK's LAW
DICrIONARY 700 (6th ed. 1990). This term was selected because it implies that some
sort of substantial damage must be done to an owner's ability to control or use the
relevant network. Incapacitating should be contrasted with terms such as injure or
damage which involve actions that gain legal significance while involving much lower
levels of actual harm. See id. at 785 (defining "injure"), 389 (defining "damage"). The
term "incapacitation" represents an attempt to avoid cases such as Germany's banning
of access to various pornographic World Wide Web sites from rising to a level of a
violation of international law.
24 The term "owners" is used because it limits the definition to those entities
which actually have proprietary rights to network. The vast number of important infor-
mation networks in private hands in the United States dictate the selection of the term
"owners" over a term such as "states" or "nations." See Security in Cyberspace, supra
note 5, at 151.
See ARQUILLA & RONFELDT, supra note 3, at 33-35.
u See Security in Cyberspace, supra note 5, at 151 (delineating several specific
networks that "are so vital that their incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating
impact on the defense or economic security of the United States").
" Information warfare includes all activities which fall under the rubric of "comput-
er crime" except actions undertaken to spy on another country. Also, unlike computer
crime, information warfare requires a state, not an individual or corporation, to engage
in the actions. See infra notes 22-27 and accompanying text.
1998]
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culty condemning.' Existing international law clearly prohibits one state
from interfering in the affairs of another state via the use of physical
force.29
"Chipping" presents a method of corrupting information networks by
integrating computer chips with built-in weaknesses or flaws." Chipping
represents an especially significant threat because the complexity of
computer chip technology makes detecting an adulterated chip very diffi-
cult.3 The inclusion of chipping into the proposed definition of IW
represents an attempt to control and deter this activity.
Information networks require computer software to manage them.32
If this software becomes corrupted, the system will fail.3 Software is by
its very nature incredibly complex and often it will simply fail on its own
accord.34 Several different types of computer programs have been de-
signed to purposely interfere with the functioning of a computer. 5 At-
See Security in Cyberspace, supra note 5, at 155. Such actions could include use
of truck bombs or cruise missiles to destroy important telecommunications resources, for
example, an AT&T switching node. See id.
' See Sean P. Kanuck, Information Warfare: New Challenges for Public Interna-
tional Law, 37 HARv. INT'L. L. J. 272, 275 n.17 (1996) (discussing "use of force" as
expressed in the U.N. Charter).
30 See SCHWARTAU, supra note 7, at 164-65 (providing a comprehensive analysis of
chipping and its potential effects). A computer chip is a very thin wafer of silicon
which has millions of instructions etched onto it in the form of paths, connections,
gates, and switches. See id. at 161. All digital technology is based on the use of these
chips. See id. at 162. The copying of chips is an on-going problem. See id. Numerous
Pacific Rim countries engineer and manufacture U.S. and Japanese computer chips. See
id. The potential exists for a country manufacturing pirate chips to insert some sort of
malicious code into those chips which will cause them to fail at a critical time. See
id. at 166. The code in an existing device can also be altered. See id. at 165.
31 See id. at 164-65.
32 JAN HRUsKA, COMPUTER VIRUSES AND ANTI-VIRus WARFARE 1-4 (1992).
3 This problem could allow for the destruction of the world's most advanced
weapons systems without weapons ever being fired. See DEP'T OF THE AIR FORCE,
INFORMATION WARFARE 11 (1996) (describing how an F-16 can be destroyed merely
by loading faulty instructions into its flight control computer).
'4 See LEONARD LEE, THE DAY THE PHONES STOPPED 11 (1991) (describing an
incident occurring in the mid-eighties where a Canadian X-ray machine was found to
be giving lethal doses of radiation to patients, due only to a small error in its
programming that had gone undetected for years); SCHWARTAU, supra note 7, at 97. In
1988, a software error in American Airlines new reservation system cost the airline $50
million in losses by making it appear that unsold seats had been purchased when they
had not. See id.
5 HRUSKA, supra note 32, at 17-25 (1992).
These programs include:
572 [Vol. 30.567
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tacks by malicious software represent a primary source of concern for the
operators of computer networks.'
Inundating a network with so many requests that the network ceases
to function is known as a "denial-of-service attack."'37 Such attacks have
proved effective against some information networks.38 The U.S. Depart-
ment of Defense has expressed concerns that such attacks could cripple
the civil information infrastructure relied upon by the military3 9 Difficul-
ty arises in considering denial-of-service activity illegal because the
underlying act, use of the information network, is neither considered
illegal nor harmful. ° Nevertheless, because harm occurs when an orga-
nized effort saturates a network, it might be possible to place responsibili-
ty on the party organizing the saturating attack. For that reason, the
definition of IW includes denial-of-service operations if a state organizes
them.4
1) Trojan Horses: programs which perform services stated in their specifications, these
additional services are usually harmful;
2) Logic Bombs: programs which execute some program code, usually harmful, once a
set of conditions has been fulfilled;
3) Viruses: self-replicating computer code requiring execution. These normally contain
some sort of side effect. It attempts to spread by hiding them itself for as long as
possible before executing the side effect (this closely resembles biological viruses which
are infectious during an incubation period when the victim manifests no outward
symptoms of the side effect);
4) Worms: programs which are very similar to viruses, but they replicate in their
entirety and do not need a carrier program.
See id.
See SCHWARTAU, supra note 7, at 96-98.
See Peter Costantini, Information Warriors Form New Army, INTER PRESS SERv.
Aug. 9, 1996, available in 1996 WL 10768646.
3' See id. (explaining how a man in Maryland overloaded a 9-1-1 emergency system
by programming a computer to continuously call the system, eventually causing it to
shut-down).
" See id. (noting that in December of 1995 protesters were able to force the
French government to shut down its Internet servers); see also U.S. GEN. ACCOuNTING
OFFICE, INFORMATION SEcuRrrY: COMPTER ATTAcKs AT THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE POSE INCREASING RiSKS GAO/AIMD-96-84 (May 22, 1996)
<http:llwww.fas.org/irp/gao/aim96084.htm> [hereinafter GAO REPORT] (noting that the
Department of Defense is concerned with the destruction of civilian information net-
works which it is estimated carry 90% of military communication).
' See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(1) (1997). The use of a network only becomes
criminal when a person "knowingly accesses a computer without authorization." Id.
4' But see ARQUILLA & RONFELDT, supra note 3, at 50-52 (arguing denial of
service operations represent a method of information warfare that states will not fre-
quently utilize). The level of publicity required to organize such a campaign prevents
it from occurring in secret or the state will deny organizing it. Id. Denial-of-service
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Information Warfare as defined here is to be contrasted with other
terms often used with it. These include the terms "information-age war-
fare," 42 "netwar,"'43 and "computer crime." Information-age warfare
merely involves the application of information-age technologies to perform
combat operations more effectively.45 International law already condemns
the use of conventional military force, with a few limited exceptions. The
addition of computers to a bomber or tank does not alter its legal status.
Thus, the mere application of advanced technology to normal weaponry
does not fall under the rubric of IW.
B. Information Warfare Is Not Netwar
"Netwar" represents a method of organizing combatants rather than
a mechanism for specifically targeting information networks.' As its
name implies, netwar involves organizing combatants into networks.'
Although this organizational technique relies on the information networks
that would be IW's battleground,' netwar primarily appeals to sub-na-
tional, non-state actors.49 Placing netwar in the same rubric as IW cre-
campaigns also have difficulty targeting vital information networks required by the
definition because such networks tend to be tightly insulated from public access. See
generally Costantini, supra note 37 (noting French protestors targeted France's World
Wide Web sites, which although valuable to people interested in learning about France,
are not considered to be a vital part of France's information network).
42 See DEP'T. OF THE AIR FORCE, CORNERSTONES OF INFORMATION WARFARE 2 n.1
(1995) [hereinafter CORNERSTONES].
See ARQUILLA & RONFELDT, supra note 3, at vii.
See generally Catherine Therese Clarke, From CrimlNet to Cyber-Perp: Toward
an Inclusive Approach to Policing the Evolving Criminal Mens Rea on the Internet, 75
OR. L. REv. 191 (1996) (discussing the confusion over what should constitute a crime
on the Internet).
45 See CORNERSTONES, supra note 42, at 2 n.1 (explaining that the use of so-
phisticated computers to guide cruise missiles to their targets represents an example of
information-age warfare).
•' See ARQUILLA & RONFELDT, supra note 3, at 15-16.
4 See id. at 11-12. The network offers numerous advantages to those actors willing
to employ it. Id. In terms of offensive potential it is adaptable, flexible, and versatile
in responding to the target it is attacking. Id. The network can effectively respond to
most problems because all of its elements are discreetly divided, yet have the capability
of rapid mobilization. Id. Defensively, the network has a high degree a resilience
because even if some elements are destroyed the rest remain. Id.
48 See id. at 15-16.
9 See id. at 53-54. Such non-state actors include Transnational Criminal Orga-
nizations (TCO's). They also include non-governmental organizations from across the
political spectrum such as the right wing Militia Movement in the United States and
574 [Vol. 30:567
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ates two problems for international law. First, netwar involves primarily
sub-national actors over which international law lacks jurisdiction." Sec-
ond, although the groups engaged in netwar may employ the techniques
of IW, netwar is primarily focused on how the combatants are organized.
An international law declaring the network form of organization illegal
seems foolish. Such law could never receive effective enforcement."
Moreover, it would seem that merely structuring a group of people into
a certain type of organization does not represent any sort of threat worthy
of international attention.
C. Computer Crime Is Not Information Warfare
Computer crime represents the activity most likely to be confused
with IW 2 The phrase "computer crime" is itself a nebulous term cover-
ing a gamut of actions ranging from releasing a supposedly benign
virus,53 or hacking into computers to look at information,54 to causing
leftist Zapatista movement in Mexico. See id. at 61-64, 71-73.
'a See BROWNLIE, supra note 18, at 59 (noting that states and some international
organizations are the usual or traditional subjects of international law).
"' In the United States, government efforts to enforce such a law would probably
be viewed as an unconstitutional abridgment of First Amendment rights of assembly
and petition. See U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
" The press frequently labels criminal or espionage actions as information warfare.
See, e.g., Chris Williams, Air Force Battles Computer Hackers, ROCKY MoUNTAIN
NEws, Aug. 16, 1996, at 42A. See also Susan Crabtree, Cyberspace: A Terrorist
Frontier?, WASH TIMES, Aug. 19, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Papers file.
However, even experts in the field have at times misnamed the activities. For instance,
Winn Schwartau has labeled simple individual invasions of privacy committed via
computers as "Class 1 information warfare." See SCHWARTAU, supra note 7, at 258.
Schwartau considers industrial espionage as "Class 2 information warfare." See id. at
271-75. Schwartau's "Class 3 information warfare" includes both sub-national and
national actor uses of information warfare. See id. at 291-310.
" See, e.g., United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d. 504 (2d. Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
502 U.S. 817 (1991). Robert Morris was convicted under the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(5)(A), for releasing a worm which eventually caused
6,000 computers to crash. However, Morris did not have a criminal mens rea when he
released the program. He merely wanted to prove his ability to write a program
capable of accessing as many computer systems as possible without destroying,
damaging, or copying any data contained therein. He actually attempted to warn
potential victims about his program when he realized it was out of control. See also
Clark, supra note 44, at 214-15; Richard D. Marks, Security, Privacy and Free Expres-
sion in the New World of Broadband Networks, 32 HouS. L. REV. 501, 507-09 (1995)
(discussing the Morris case).
' See GAO REPORT, supra note 39. In March and April of 1994, two hackers
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the computers which run the alarms at a chemical plant to malfunction.5
To further muddle the definition, many normal crimes are now committed
with the assistance of computers.56
1. Current Computer Crime Statutes Should Not Be Used to Define
Information Warfare
Law enforcement authorities have only recently begun to respond to
computer crime and crimes committed through the use of a computer.'
The current U.S. legal structure presents a disjointed view of what is
considered computer crime." Statutes such as the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act59 represent clear attempts to respond to computer crime.'
Other statutes such as the Mail Fraud6' and Copyright Statutes62 may be
electronically broke into U.S. Air Force Computers at Rome Air Force Base. See id.
They were able to make 150 intrusions, and in the process, access several other net-
works including computers at NASA and Wright Patterson Air Force Base. See id.
These two lone hackers managed to compromise three years and four million dollars
worth of research and had the power to destroy this research if they had so desired.
See id. The GAO REPORT also describes various attacks perpetrated against the U.S
Naval Academy, the Naval Research Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, and
White Sands Missile Range. See id.
"S See Costantini, supra note 37. In 1992 an employee who had been fired broke
into the computers running an emergency alert network and disabled them for ten
hours. While the computers were disabled, an emergency occurred at an oil refinery
and the attack prevented the company from alerting thousands of nearby residents of
a toxic discharge. See id.
See MJ. Zuckerman, Cracking Down on the Outlaws of Cyberspace, USA
TODAY, July 2, 1996, at 4B. In 1994, in St. Petersburg, Russia, hackers managed to
"withdraw" almost $10 million from Citibank before a leading international computer
security firm shut them down. Five people were arrested and all but $400,000 of the
stolen funds were recovered. See id. Additionally, Jake Baker, a twenty-year-old college
student, found himself under arrest and in jail for twenty-nine days after posting a
sexually violent story in an Internet newsgroup. The woman in the story, who was
raped, tortured, and murdered, had the same last name as one of Baker's classmates at
the University of Michigan. Baker finally secured his release after multiple psychiatric
evaluations, which revealed that he did not display any risk factors associated with
potential violence to others. See Clark, supra note 44, at 213 n.95.
See Clarke, supra note 44, at 191-93, 224-25.
s See, e.g., Lt. Col. John T. Soma et al., Computer Crime: Substantive Statutes &
Technical & Legal Search Considerations, 39 A.F. L. REV. 225, 226-30 (1996) (pos-
iting that 23 different U.S. Code sections criminalize certain conduct involving comput-
ers and information networks).
59 18 U.S.C. § 1030. (1996)
o See Soma, supra note 58, at 226.
61 18 U.S.C. 1341 (1994) and 18 U.S.C. 1343 (1994) (18 U.S.C. 1343 specifically
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used to prosecute normal crimes such as fraud and copyright violations if
they are committed through the use of a computer.63 As currently de-
fined, computer crime represents a flawed basis to define IW. The statutes
targeting computer criminals have been written with the intent of prose-
cuting individuals, not nation-states. The U.S. statutes also criminalize
invasions of privacy that occur via information networks.'
While U.S. citizens have justifiable concern about the erosion of
privacy computers can cause,' these concerns should not form a basis
for a response to IW in the international arena. First, individuals do not
have standing to bring suits under international law.' Second, an attempt
to create international privacy standards would face significant problems
due to the wide variation in the importance of privacy around the
world.67 Third, individuals already have virtually have no privacy due to
the immense power of a state to gather information." Thus, attacks by
individuals against other individuals in other counties should not become
part of the definition of IW.69
criminalized the use of computer or telephones to exchange information across state
lines in furtherance of a mail fraud scheme).
62 17 U.S.C. 506 (1994).
6 See Soma, supra note 58, at 229-30.
' See infra Part I.D (explaining why espionage is not prohibited under international
law).
' See generally SCHWARTAU, supra note 7, at 259-70 (discussing current issues
regarding electronic privacy).
6 See BROWNLiE, supra note 18, at 60 (noting that "individuals and groups them-
selves have no procedural rights before any international forum").
67 See JERRY M. ROSENBERG, THE DEATH OF PRIVACY 18-19 (1969).
63 See SCHWARTAU, supra note 7, at 17 (discussing that every individual's electronic
identity is unprotected). Most of what is viewed as private information, for example,
health or financial records and criminal history, is already stored in governmental
databases. See id. See also International Terrorism, supra note 12 (Statement of Senator
Kyl). Even physical privacy is undercut by devices such as Russian satellites which
have resolutions of one meter. Id. See also SC-WARTAU, supra note 7, at 138-47
(describing the Van Eck effect which allows for the passive remote reading of
computer-generated radiation at a range of up to one kilometer). All academic and
public discussions of the Van Eck effect were immediately classified as "secret" by the
National Security Agency). See id.
" See M.E. Bowman, Is International Law Ready for the Information Age?, 19
FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 1935, 1942 (1996) (describing assorted attempts by various
countries to protect their nation-specific interests on the Internet). This does not mean
that international action will not be necessary to combat criminal use of information
technologies. The interconnected nature of information networks means activity on them
can easily cause effects in multiple states. National governments will need to cooperate
with each other to solve some of these problems. See id.
5771998]
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2. Information Warfare Requires State Involvement
IW is quantitatively different from computer crime. Although the
technology and ability to engage in computer crime is widespread," the
ability to engage in IW is decidedly less common.7' Two elements
distinguish IW from computer crime, the scale of the attacks and the
actors conducting the attacks.' IW would require crippling attacks on
the secure information networks of a country. To achieve the results
accurately that would be described as true IW would require covert
expenditures of at least 100 million dollars,7 although one billion dollars
may represent a more accurate figure.74 Only four groups realistically
have these levels of resources: states, terrorist groups supported by states,
large criminal enterprises such as Chinese Tongs or Columbian drug
barons, and large multinational corporations.'
However, not all of these actors have a motivation to engage in IW
campaigns. Large multinational corporations have no interest in collapsing
70 See Security in Cyberspace, supra note 12 (statement of John Deutch, Director
of Central Intelligence). "Virtually any 'bad actor' can acquire the hardware and
software needed to attack some of our critical information-based infrastructures." Id. See
also Gary H. Anthes, White House Launches Cybershield: U.S. Moves to Safeguard Its
Infrastructure, COMPUTERWORLD, July 22, 1996, at 29. "But [vulnerability information]
is all over the Internet," said Sen Sam (D-Ga.). "The only people who don't know
about it are the people in government with responsibility for protecting the infrastruc-
ture." Id.
7, See RAND CORPORATION, THAT WILD, WILD CYBERsPACE FRONTIER <http://
www.rand.org/publications/RRI/RRR.fa1195.cyber/wild.html> (1995) (visited Mar. 5,1997)
[hereinafter RAND CoRP]. "The resources required to cause harm in this cyberspace
world are relatively small: one (or at the most a few) computer experts with computer
terminals hooked into the worldwide network can do considerable damage. The
resources required for a nation or group to do significant damage to the military, econ-
omy, or society of another nation are larger, but far fewer than those required to
acquire and use major weapon systems." Additionally, although no major disasters have,
as of yet occurred, potential exists for a state or terrorist group to inflict substantial
damage sometime in the future. See id.
" See SCHWARTAU, supra note 7, at 290-96. (noting that while essentially the tech-
niques employed by those engaging in computer crime and 1W are the same, the nature
of the actors and the extent of their activities can provide a meaningful basis for
distinguishing between the two types of activity).
' See id. at 293 (speculating that $100 million would be needed to launch an
effective "Class 3" or Global Information Warfare campaign).
"' See Laqueur, supra note 8, at 15 (noting claims by a U.S. intelligence officer
that with $1 billion and twenty capable hackers he could "shut down America").
75 See ARQUILLA & RONFELDT, supra note 3, at 34 (1996).
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governments and creating social instability because multinational corpora-
tions depend on smoothly functioning international economies.76 The
economic and social chaos resulting from a true 1W campaign serves as
a powerful deterrent to corporations who might consider orchestrating the
collapse of a country's vital national information networks just to harm
a competitor based in that country. Criminal organizations also have no
real interest in collapsing governments." Criminal organizations share the
corporation's interest in the existence of a well- functioning economy.78
Thus, state-sponsored organizations represent the only parties that have
both the motivation and the resources to engage in 1W.79 If these parties
engaged in IW, it would be a fundamentally different activity than those
of the lone hacker breaking into Air Force computers. 8° The state-sup-
ported terrorist or the individual state which conducts 1W may have a
variety of motivations for doing so, but their general aims are similar -
to weaken or destroy some perceived enemy.
D. Espionage Is Not Information Warfare
The term "computer crime" also includes intelligence collection
activities,8 which is conducted by all advanced states. Intelligence col-
76 See Gompert, supra note 6 (arguing that corporations have a significant interest
in obtaining knowledge about information warfare to prepare defenses against such
attacks).
7 See Laqueur, supra note 8, at 14.
See id.
7 See id. (explaining how countries such as Sudan, Libya, and Iran are known to
have supported terrorist attacks against the United States and its allies, suggesting that
if these countries were to acquire the ability to engage in information warfare they
would likely use it against the United States). See also Lorenzo Valeri, Guarding
Against a New Digital Enemy, JANE'S INTELLIGENCE REv., Aug. 1997, at 381 (noting
that Israel, India, Russia, and China have all begun to develop IW programs).
W See GAO REPORT, supra note 39 (discussing the national security threat posed
by such attacks). State-sponsored 1W likely would be on a much larger scale than
could be conducted by any one individual. See id. State-sponsored IW could provide
the money required to pay the bribes required to gain access to the most important and
most secure information networks. See id. (noting that the most important information,
tactics of war and top-secret research are "(1) protected on computers isolated from
outside networks, (2) encrypted, or (3) only transmitted on dedicated secure circuits").
These precautions require someone seeking access to these information networks to have
an "inside" source before gaining such access. See RAND CORP, supra note 71 (explain-
ing how state-sponsored IW would be much more potent than any damage individual
hackers might cause).
"I See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(3) for a statute criminalizing unauthorized access of a
government computer. Under this statute someone only needs to access a computer to
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lection activities, however, should not have a place in the definition of
IW. Intelligence collection does not per se violate customary international
law.82 The use of the terms "incapacitating," "use," and "manage" in the
definition effectively exclude observational espionage from the current
definition of IW. These terms imply that techniques employed must sig-
nificantly hinder the operation of an information network, or in computer
terms, cause the network to "crash."
A plausible construction of these terms might include actions that
involve the monitoring of "secure" information networks. 3 The very act
of monitoring the network and acquiring the information it contains,
breaches the network's security and decreases the owner's ability to use
the network for private communications." This concern may become
particularly acute when evaluating economic espionage. Estimates in the
economic losses by U.S. companies as the result of economic spying
range from $800 million85 to $24 billion annually.86 In May 1996, the
National Counterintelligence Center reported that twelve unnamed coun-
tries were using various espionage techniques to acquire U.S. proprietary
information and twenty-six additional countries were under investiga-
tionY Although observational espionage activity directed against comput-
commit a crime. No malicious interference in the owners' ability to use the computer
need occur.
See W. Hays Parks, The International Law of Intelligence Collection, in NATION-
AL SEcuRrrY LAW, 433, 433 (John Norton Moore et al. eds., 1990). Parks notes that
although numerous domestic laws exist to hinder foreign intelligence collection efforts,
"[n]o serious proposal ever has been made within the international community to
prohibit intelligence collection as a violation of international law because of the tacit
acknowledgement by nations that it is important to all, and practiced by each." Id. at
433-34.
' See GAO REPORT, supra note 39. "Secure" information networks limit access and
use to a very select group of people. See id.
84 See Gavin Souter, Protecting Policyholder Information, BUS. INS., Jan. 15, 1996,
at 24D (explaining how one breach of network security could compromise thousands of
users); see also GAO REPORT, supra note 39 (noting that a single hacker was able to
acquire 12,000 passwords from the U.S Naval Academy).
See Crabtree, supra note 52 (noting that hospitals and banks have been par-
ticularly hurt by computer espionage).
' See Donnelly, supra note 14. This figure includes all losses from economic
spying, not just breeches of computer security. See id.
' See id. Although unnamed in the report, such countries probably include allies
such as the United Kingdom, Canada, Switzerland, Taiwan, Israel, and Australia because
these countries possess both the capability and motivation to engage in such espionage
activities. See SCHWARTAU, supra note 7, at 274-75. See generally PETER SCHWErrZER,
FRMNDLY SPIS (1993) (describing the activities of German, Japanese, and French in-
dustrial spies). But see id. (describing U.S. industrial espionage efforts).
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er networks may have significant economic impacts, several factors
militate against equating such activity with 1W. First, because all techno-
logically advanced countries engage in this type of espionage, any effort
to limit the ability of states to engage in this type of activity would not
be seriously considered by the international community.' This lack of
consideration could potentially undermine efforts to create a framework to
regulate the much more damaging IW activities. 9 Second, any prohibi-
tion of industrial espionage would be almost impossible to enforce. The
passive nature of observation means it is much more difficult to detect
than events which actively incapacitate an information network. Finally,
the companies whose computers and information are targeted can best
protect themselves from industrial espionage committed using network-
based approaches.' ° Thus, the international norm of ignoring espionage
activities should also cover espionage activities directed at information
networks.
I1. INFORMATION WARFARE AND THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW
Information warfare requires an international response. The global
spread of information networks and the interconnections among networks
means that only an international legal apparatus can provide an effective
response.9' An international response to the issue of IW is probably inevi-
' See Parks, supra note 72, at 433; Myres S. McDougal et al., The World Process
of Effective Power: The Global War System, in POWER AND POLICY IN QUEST OF LAW
353, 380-81 (Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman eds., 1985) (explaining that
a failure to properly gather and process intelligence information can lead to unnecessary
conflict). See also Bill Gertz, Foreign Spies Look to Acquire U.S. Economic and Trade
Data, WASH. Tmias, Aug. 14, 1997, at A6. (describing how the State Department has
hindered FBI efforts to prosecute economic espionage because of fears that it would
complicate diplomacy).
' See Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AM. J. INT'L
L. 705, 712 (1988) (noting that certain rules regarding spying under the guise of
diplomacy, recognized at least formally in the community of states, possess so low a
degree of legitimacy that they "exert virtually no pull towards compliance"). For a
legal response to BV to be effective, that is, by causing compliance, it will require
legitimacy. Id. Thus, to avoid a prima facie degradation of the definition's legitimacy,
intelligence collection activities must be excluded.
' See Marks, supra note 53, at 509 n.59 (noting that the Senate, in considering the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, concluded that private companies were best
able to protect themselves against computer crime).
" See Bowman, supra note 69, at 1945. See also Greg Rattray, The Emerging
Global Information Infrastructure and National Security, FLETCHER FORUM OF WORLD
AFF., Summer-Fall 1997, at 81, 93-95. (describing the need for multilateral efforts to
control IW and positing several different international mechanisms).
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table.' The issue is then, how will the international legal community
respond to the problem? Will the world choose to wait until some crisis
occurs and then scramble to respond, or will the international community
chose to discuss the regulation of 1W and hopefully stave off a crisis? An
examination of the transnational nature of IW and of the weaknesses of
unilateral solutions such as the extraterritorial application of domestic laws
lead to a clearer idea of which approach the international *community
needs to use. Only an international mechanism such as that found in
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter offers a solution to the problem of infor-
mation warfare.
A. The Transnational Nature of Information Warfare
Several aspects of IW cause problems for those attempting to
regulate it. First, although IW capabilities will cost in the hundreds of
millions of dollars, this is considered to be relatively inexpensive for a
weapons system and it makes IW capabilities easy to acquire.9 1W
capabilities become especially cost-effective and desirable because they
offer the opportunity to strike at the hearts of the most advanced
countries and economies of the world.94 The reliance by 1W on comput-
ers and related technology also presents problems for those seeking to
regulate it.9" Computers represent a stark example of dual-use technolo-
gy, a technology usable for either peaceful or military purposes.' The
dual-use nature of computers makes controlling their proliferation espe-
cially difficult.' The marketplace inherently makes efforts to unilaterally
halt the proliferation of computers nearly impossible.98 Furthermore, even
9 See Kanuck, supra note 29, at ,291-92.
See RAND CORP., supra note 71 (arguing that IW systems require fewer resources
than other major weapons systems).
9 See International Terrorism, supra note 12 (testimony of Casper Weinberger,
Former Secretary of Defense). Currently the United States is impervious to conventional
forms of warfare and is only vulnerable to terrorism and other non-conventional forms
of attack.
' See SCHWARTAU, supra note 7, at 17 (describing how various computers are
critical to W).
' See Michael S. Lelyveld, U.S. Wants Return of Supercomputer, J. COM., Feb. 27,
1997, at IA (explaining how an IBM supercomputer that Russia sought to purchase
could be used for either forbidden military purposes or approved weather forecasting).
' See Rattray, supra note 91, at 87-88 (noting that increases in mobility and scien-
tific literacy make it almost impossible to control the spread of computer technology).
" See Gary H. Anthes, Restrictions Lifted on Export of High-Performance Comput-
ers, COMPUTERWORLD, Oct. 16, 1995, at 32 (explaining how, before the U.S. govern-
ment lifted export restrictions, U.S. computer manufacturers lost billions of dollars in
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if the countries primarily responsible for manufacturing computers could
agree to a control regime, the regime could be easily circumvented. Some
countries would willingly serve as intermediaries for the transit of com-
puters to the embargoed states.' Any international regime for the control
of computer technology would be attacked as an attempt by the techno-
logically advanced states to establish some sort of information or comput-
ing hegemony." Finally, even with intensive and lengthy probes it may
be impossible to verify that a computer has had no role in an 1W ef-
fort."' Thus, the technological capabilities to conduct IW will rapidly
spread.10
The second major problem that IW presents to the international
community regards the difficult determination of when and if an attack
has begun.0 3 The incorporeal nature of many types of 1W, such as
computer viruses and logic bombs placed into computer programs and
sales each year to foreign competition).
' See Lelyveld, supra note 96 (explaining how a European intermediary sold an
IBM computer to Russia's Ministry of Atomic Energy. The U.S. government had
previously forbidden IBM from selling one to them).
"o See Thabo Mbeld, South African Deputy President, Address Before the Informa-
tion Society and Development (ISAD) Conference in South Africa (May 15, 1996), in
Science, Medicine and Technology, AFRICA NEws, May 1996, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Current News File (expressing concern that the developing world lacks
a basic information infrastructure and that the information revolution has not benefitted
the developing world). See also Henrikas Yushkiavitshus, Law, Civil Society, and
National Security: International Dimensions, in THE INFORMATION REVOLUTION AND
NATIONAL SECURTY 46, 48-49 (Stewart J. D. Schwartzstein ed., 1996) (articulating
concerns that failing to distribute information technologies internationally would augment
inequalities between developed and developing countries and lead to new forms of
exclusion).
.0. See Rattray, supra note 91, at 91-92, (noting that the innocuous and ubiquitous
nature of information technologies make attempts to control their spread futile). See
Lelyveld, supra note 96 (discussing how the ability to use a computer transcends
national boundaries). This might be reflected by an individual in one country using a
computer in another country to conduct research unable to be done in their own
country due to, perhaps, strict import or export controls placed upon computers. See id.
0 See generally ROGER C. MOLANDER FT AL., RAND CORPORATION, STRATEGIC
INFORMATION WARFARE: A NEW FACE OF WAR 17-18 (1996) (noting the "low entry
cost" of AV).
3 See Bowman, supra note 69, at 1942. "It will be difficult, perhaps even im-
possible, to know whether an intrusion represents the exuberance of a curious, youthful
hacker or a test of destructive information warfare capabilities. At best, the distinctions
between 'crime' and 'warfare,' 'accident' and 'attack' will be blurred." Id. See also
id. at 19-22, 26-29 (describing this situation in terms of blurred traditional boundaries,
lack of strategic intelligence, and difficulty of tactical warning and attack assessment).
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electro-magnetic interference with radio and satellite transmissions,
challenges an international legal system that defines warfare in terms of
physical violence.'" This situation also makes an ex ante determination
of the initiation of 1W nearly impossible. However, ex post analysis of
the scale of attack, the sophistication of the techniques employed, the
individuals involved, and nature of the information networks targeted will
offer the opportunity to determine whether an 1W attack has in fact oc-
curred.' °5 Currently, ex post analytic techniques allow for the determina-
tion of the source of attacks involving physical destruction,"°  corrupt
hardware,1 7 corrupt software,' 8 and denial-of-service attacks.'" If an
,"4 "Both the Geneva Conventions and the United Nations Charter, taproots for dis-
cussion of the law of war, define warfare in terms of actual armed conflict, punctuated
by bullets and bombs." Smith, supra note 8, at 12; see also Kanuck, supra note 29,
at 275-76 (discussing the challenges that IW presents to an international paradigm based
on territorial sovereignty).
"0S Some reduction in confusion may occur as more information networks begin to
implement safe operating practices. As information networks operate more securely, it
will take more and more technical sophistication to incapacitate them. Moreover, as
technical sophistication increases, the number of casual hackers will certainly decrease
and state-supported actors will make up a greater proportion of the attacks. See
Symantec Announces NCSA Certification of its DOS, Windows, and Macintosh Antivirus
Product Line, PR NEwswIRE, April 1, 1996 available in WL, 4/1/96 PR Newswire
08:10:00 (noting that although the virus problem is serious, protective software offers
an effective cure); See also Williams, supra note 52, at 42A (noting that security
software would take care of 80% of the Air Force's information security problems and
that more expensive encryption and hardware techniques would solve the other 20%).
"o See International Terrorism, supra note 12 (testimony of Louis J. Freeh, F.B.I.
Director). The United States on the basis of physical analysis of evidence concluded
Libya had been responsible for the bombing of Pan Am flight 103. A shard of a
timing device smaller than a fingernail provided the clinching evidence. See id.
" If a piece of hardware fails consistently when certain parameters have been met,
tests will reveal this. Once the component has been identified, it becomes relatively
easy to trace the components back to the potential sources. Of course, if counterfeit
components have been surreptitiously inserted into the production process, the problem
becomes more difficult.
1o See HRUSKA, supra note 32, at 69-70. The complexity of computer software and
the multitude of approaches to solving a programming problem mean that many pro-
grammers develop a signature programming style which will help to identify the virus.
Id. The language and spelling contained within the program can also yield clues to the
origin of the virus. Id. The existence of illegal instructions in the program can help
determine on what type of computer the program was written. Id. However, any
sophisticated programmer will recognize these issues and do their best to confuse the
investigators by leaving false clues. Id.
09 See Costantini, supra note 37. Effective denial-of-service attacks represent a
massive undertaking, similar to a large protest on the Washington Mall. Such protests
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international regime relies on ex post analysis it becomes more reactive,
rather than proactive.
B. Extraterritoriality Offers No Solution
The only mechanism besides international law capable of creating the
transnational jurisdiction necessary to properly respond to 1W is the
extraterritorial application of domestic legislation."0 Technologically ad-
vanced countries represent the countries most likely to attempt to apply
their laws extraterritorially."' Those countries who have clear vulnerabil-
ities to 1W attacks will have strong desires to control the ability of these
attacks to inflict harm."' An analysis of current U.S. laws applicable to
1W activities reveals the problems involved in applying these laws
extraterritorially. The United States serves as the focus of this analysis
because it represents a country with a significant vested interest in
preventing W. The United States is also one of the leading users of
extraterritoriality.'
4
As previously noted, numerous U.S. laws criminalize activities that
may be characterized as 1W."' This analysis is limited to the statute
written specifically to control computer crime, the Computer Security Act
require a large amount of communication before the actual "attack" occurs. See id. An
analysis of this communication will reveal if state actors have been influential in
initiating the operations.
12' Black's Law Dictionary defines "extraterritoriality" as "their operation upon
persons, rights, or jural relations, existing beyond the limits of the enacting state or
nation, but still amenable to its laws." See BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY, supra note 23,
at 588.
..' See generally ARQUaLA & RONFELDT, supra note 3, at 41-42.
112 But see Andrew Rathmell, Netwar in the Gulf <http://www.infowar.com/class_3/
class3_q.html-ssi> (visited on June 9, 1997) (arguing that the Gulf States might also
want to engage in defensive information warfare to prevent corrupting influences from
reaching their people and thereby providing a basis for dissent).
... See MOLANDER, supra note 102, at 30-31 (noting that the U.S. economy is
becoming increasingly dependent upon information networks). See also DIECTvE
96/9/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE CoUNcIL ON THE LEGAL PRO-
TEION OF DATABASES, 1996 OJ. (L77/20) (directing that all European countries
standardize their database protection laws and criminalize unauthorized access to data-
bases).
"" See Geoffrey R. Watson, The Death of Treaty, 55 OIo ST. L. J. 781, 839-40
(1994) (noting that Congress and the executive branch appear to have "boundless
enthusiasm for extraterritoriality, and that the judicial branch is prepared to defer to
it).
"' See supra notes 58-63 (describing several of the 23 U.S. Code sections that
touch on computer crime).
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of 1986.' Two features of this act make it ill-suited for extraterritorial
application in the international arena. First, the statute criminalizes the
unauthorized access of U.S. government computers," 7 or even more
broadly, unauthorized access to any computer the U.S. government has
deemed vital to national defense or foreign relations,"' even if that
access results in no damage to those computers or the information stored
on them. These laws criminalize observational espionage involving a
computer. While the government has a legitimate interest in protecting its
computers from spies, extraterritorial application of this law would
contravene the general international norm tolerating observational espio-
nage activities." 9 Reliance on the extraterritorial application of U.S. law
to attempt to prosecute foreign espionage actions might also have the
unintended consequence of causing the government and corporations to
invest in fewer computer security devices than optimal."
The Computer Security Act also fails to recognize two types of IW.
The statute ignores activities such as "chipping," which involves the
substitution of defective component parts into an information network'
and denial-of-service activities.'" The failure to include these activities
in the statute means a regime relying on extraterritorial application of
U.S. law will not include significant aspects of IW. The failure to include
chipping constitutes an especially significant problem because of the
devastating potential of this type of attack and the numerous countries ca-
pable of conducting such an attack."
Similarly, the extraterritorial application of U.S. criminal laws creates
the problem of "furious resistance" from the international community. 4
The United States created an international uproar when it kidnapped a
16 18 U.S.C. § 1030.
117 Id. § 1030(a)(3).
118 Id. § 1030(a)(1). The European Community holds a similar view about unautho-
rized access to computer databases. See Directive 96/9/EC, supra note 113, at 22
("the author's exclusive rights should include the right to determine the way in which
his work is exploited and by whom, and in particular to control the distribution of his
work to unauthorized persons").
... See supra notes 82, 89-90 (arguing that observational espionage does not violate
international law and private companies are best positioned to institute the necessary
measures to protect themselves from espionage efforts).
"20 See Marks, supra note 53, at 509 n.59 (explaining the Senate's decision to limit
the jurisdiction of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986).
1 See supra notes 30-31 (explaining the process of "chipping").
2 See supra notes 37-41 (explaining denial-of-service attacks).
' See SCHWARTAU, supra note 7, at 160-70 (arguing that there has been a general
failure of the government to respond to the problem presented by "chipping").
124 See Watson, supra note 114, at 840-41.
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fugitive in Mexico wanted in connection with the slaying of a U.S. Drug
Enforcement Agency agent,'" and imprisoned Panamanian General
Manual Noriega on U.S. drug charges after invading his country and
capturing him in the process.'" The issue of extraterritorial application
of U.S. law causes friction not only with those states typically prone to
criticize the United States, but also with its closest allies.'" The combi-
nation of inadequate laws and general resistance to extraterritoriality
undermines it as a viable solution to the issue of 1W.
IV. ARTICLE 2(4) OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AND
INFORMATON WARFARE
The U.N. Charter lies at the heart of a complex system of treaties
and organizations designed to allow states to peacefully resolve their
disputes and end the need for states to employ force as a dispute resolu-
tion mechanism.'" The drafters of the charter intended it to resolve the
shortcomings of the previous prohibition on war, the Kellogg-Briand
Pact.'" Article 2(4) of the charter is the primary embodiment of interna-
tional law's current attempt to restrain the use of force.'30 Article 2(4)
'" See United States v. Alvarez-Machan, 504 U.S. 655 (1992) (involving a doctor
who had participated in the kidnapping and murder of a U.S. Drug Enforcement
Agency (DEA) agent working in Mexico). The outrage expressed by the international
community at the U.S. decision to kidnap Alvarez-Machan demonstrates a strong belief
in the importance of sovereignty. The level of outrage which could occur if the United
States kidnapped someone to prosecute them for something as innocuous as program-
ming a computer would likely be overwhelming. See Watson, supra note 114, at 839-
40.
" See Waston, supra note 114, at 839-40.
127 U.S. allies particularly resent the application of U.S. export laws to foreign-
incorporated subsidiaries of U.S. companies. See id. at 840-41. See David E. Sanger,
U.S. Won't Offer Trade Testimony on Cuba Embargo, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1997, at
Al (describing the outrage leveled by Canada, Mexico, and Europe against the Helms-
Burton Act which seeks to impose extraterritorially sanctions against foreign companies
conducting business in Cuba).
"2s See Oscar Schachter, International Law: The Right of States to Use Armed Force,
82 MICH. L. REv. 1620, 1620 (1984). "When the United Nations Charter was adopted,
it was generally considered to have outlawed war. States accepted the obligation to
settle all disputes by peaceful means and to refrain from the use of threat of the use
of force in their international relations." Id.
9 See YoRAM DINSThIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 83-84 (2nd ed.
1994). The Kellog-Briand Pact (1928) was an attempt, at least by its 63 contracting
parties, to declare war illegal. See id.
,"' See BROWNLIE, supra note 18, at 112; INGRID DETrER DE Lupis, THE LAW OF
WAR 56 (1987); See DINSTEIN, supra note 129, at 84 (explaining that the expression
"use of force" includes war, measures short of war, and even threats of force).
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proclaims,
All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of
the United Nations. 
13
Article 2(4) offers a clear and unequivocal prohibition on states' usage of
force.' 32 Nevertheless, several important exceptions exist to Article 2(4)'s
prohibition, including Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, which allows for
self-defence and collective self-defence,'3 ' and various U.N. resolutions
which have created a right to use force in support of self-determination
movements.'"
A. Article 2(4) Does Change States' Behavior
It has been viewed as "surprising" that international law is ever
obeyed.'35 Compliance comes as a surprise because international law is
essentially a voluntary system. No international actor has the coercive
power that the state wields over its citizens in national legal systems.'
A cynic would argue that Article 2(4) represents an aspect of international
law, which to no one's surprise has been ignored and flaunted by the
parties in the numerous conflicts that have occurred since 1945.' 37
,31 U.N. CHARTR art. 2, para. 4.
32 See The United Nations Charter and the Use of Force: Is Article 2(4) Still
Workable?, 1984 AM. Soc'Y. INT'L L. PRoc. 68, 103 (comments by Yozo Yokota)
(complaining about the reference by previous panel speakers to the ambiguity of Article
2(4) and attributing this to the "efforts of some people [to] try to justify certain actions
that are essentially unjustifiable under this provision"). See also Schachter, supra note
128, at 1633 (noting "that Article 2(4) has a reasonably clear core meaning . . . it is
therefore unwarranted to suggest that Article 2(4) lacks the determinate content
necessary to enable it to function as a legal rule of restraint). But see Franck, supra
note 89, at 721 (arguing that although Article 2(4) seems to set out a simple rule,
certain situations, given little reading of the rule, "will produce absurd obligations at
the margins of its application"). For example, "the rule would seem to compel a state
threatened by a nuclear attack to wait until it had actually been hit ('armed attack')
before being permitted to use force in self-defense." Id. This rule-induced absurdity
leads to the rule being ignored and ultimately may cause the rule to be ignored in
other situations as well.
, U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
'4 See BROWNLiE, supra note 18, at 597-98 (describing how it may be lawful for
a self-determination movement to seize territory and for other states to use force in
support of it).
135 See Franck, supra note 89, at 705.
136 See id.
" See Schachter, supra note 128, at 1620; The United Nations Charter and the Use
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However, the former conflict between the Soviet Union and the United
States provides an explanation for the limited Cold War application of
Article 2(4).' It is important to note, even during the height of the
Cold War, Article 2(4) had an impact on the conduct of states.'39
The breakup of the Soviet Union and the end of the bi-polar interna-
tional order have created a situation in which consensus can be reached
at the United Nations. The power of U.N. consensus became evident in
1990-91 when the United Nations successfully expelled Iraq from Ku-
wait.'" The U.N. reaction to the Iraqi invasion also convincingly reaf-
firmed the support by the international community of Article 2(4).' 4'
The success by the international community in expelling Iraq from
Kuwait and the use Article 2(4) to provide the legal basis for doing so,
silenced many of the critics of Article 2(4).42 Thus, the Gulf War
of Force: Is Article 2(4) Still Workable?, 1984 AM. Soc'Y. INT'L L. PROC. 68, 68
(remarks by Richard B. Bilder) (noting that 65 major conflicts occurred between 1960
and 1982 alone).
"3 See Schachter, supra note 128, at 1621-22 (noting the U.N. Security Council has
jurisdiction to resolve disputes regarding the use of force, but that the vetoes by both
the U.S.S.R. and the United States prevented the Council from exercising its power).
'1 See id. at 1623-24 (noting states using force in "almost every case sought to be
justified by reference to the accepted charter rules"). Schachter also argues, "[Plower
and interest are not superseded by law, but law cannot be excluded from the significant
factors influencing the uses of power and the perception of interest. Id. at 1624. A
General Assembly Resolution criticizing the use of force by the U.S.S.R. in Afghanistan
and the fact that was viewed as a political setback for the U.S.S.R. provides some
indication that even during the Cold War, international law regarding force had some
validity. Id. at 1622. See also Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.CJ. 4 (June 27) (noting that the United States recognized Article 2(4) both as a "uni-
versal norm" and a "universal international law"). The Court in this case determined
Article 2(4)'s prohibition of the use of force was a principle of customary international
law, "to be thenceforth treated separately from the provisions, especially those of an
institutional kind, to which it is subject to the treaty-law plane of the Charter." Id. at
100.
"~ See Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict, 85 AM. J. INT'L
L. 452, 452-53 (1991)
"4 See id. at 453-54 ("To be sure, the statements made in the Council by gov-
ernmental representatives and those made by political leaders left no doubt that they
considered Iraq's action as aggression and a violation of Article 2(4) . . . . The
unanimity on the issue of principle strengthens its force as an interpretation of Article
2(4)"). See also Judith Gail Gardam, Proportionality and Force in International Law,
87 AM. J. INT'L L. 391, 411 (1993) (noting that "[tihe Security Council confirmed that
the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq was contrary to Article 2(4) of the United Nations
Charter").
" See DiNSTEIN, supra note 129, at 95.
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indicates that the international community views the prohibition on
unilateral use of force contained in Article 2(4) as an important interna-
tional rule and will in certain situations go to great measures to enforce
it.
B. Information Warfare Should Be Considered a Prohibited Use of Force
Under Article 2(4)
Before a country or the international community can use Article 2(4)
as a legal basis for sanctioning an activity, it must determine if that
activity is truly "force" as defined by the Article. 43 Arguably, the scope
of Article 2(4) scope prohibits only "armed force."'" The general accep-
tance of the view that the term "force," in Article 2(4), indicates "armed
force" has caused most scholars to ignore or push to the periphery
inquiries regarding the question of, "what is force?"' 4 However, wheth-
er to include 1W in an international regime designed to govern "explosive
effect(s) with shock waves and heat,"' is not a peripheral question.
In 1963, Ian Brownlie conducted a brief intellectual exercise to
determine if biological and chemical weapons constituted uses of force
according to Article 2(4)." His rationale for resolving this question is
similar to the exploration of 1W in this Note. Brownlie believes "effective
legal restraint of self-help and conquest [using these weapons] demands
their classification."'" The first reason Brownlie provides for including
these weapons under the purview of Article 2(4) is, "the agencies con-
cerned are commonly referred to as 'weapons' and as forms of
' See id.
t See BROWNLIE, supra note 18, at 513. Brownlie concludes Article 2(4) includes
force besides "armed force," but he does not indicate the nature of these other uses of
force. See Schachter, supra note 128, at 1624 (arguing for drafters of the Article to
represent a "more factual and wider word to embrace military action").
" See id. Schachter argues, "these interpretative questions concerning the meaning
of "force" and "threat of force" are of importance in some situations and they indicate
that the precise scope of the field needs further definition. However, they are essential-
ly peripheral questions." Id. See DINSTEIN, supra note 129, at 117-32 (defining the
concept of a war of aggression). The concepts of "aggression" and "intervention" have
dominated the definitional efforts of scholars discussing Article 2(4) because aggressive
force is considered illegal under Article 2(4) and typically involves intervention into an-
other state. See id.
'4 See IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES
362 (1963).
"4 See id. Much like information warfare, chemical and biological weapons do not
involve the physical explosions and violence associated with traditional conceptions of
armed force.
" See id.
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'warfare.""'4  This rational is not particularly insightful in the case of
1W because the hyperbole surrounding the subject has led to numerous de
minimis activities being called IW.'"
Brownlie's second argument for viewing chemical and biological
weapons as prohibited uses of force is much more convincing. He argues
they should be viewed as force because "these weapons are employed for
the destruction of life and property.'' 1W also has the potential to
cause this same sort of widespread destruction. If a "worm," similar to
the one that Andrew Morris released,' incapacitated a hospital's com-
puters, hundreds of lives would be in jeopardy. More terrifying, but
equally plausible, are situations that could involve the incapacitation of
the computers that control chemical plants or oil refineries, leading to
massive releases of deadly effluents.' Such attacks could have the
same devastating impact as the chemical weapons which concern
Brownlie.5 4 The ability of IW to destroy lives and property provides a
clear rational for viewing it as being prohibited by Article 2(4).
Treaty law also offers support for the argument that IW should be
viewed as a prohibited use of force under Article 2(4)."55 The analysis
of 1W as a weapons system is supported by an agreement between the
United States and the Soviet Union governing various dangerous military
activities."s This treaty considers interference with command and control
"' See id.
,m See supra note 52.
1 See Brownlie, supra note 146, at 362.
" See supra note 40.
,s See Costantini, supra note 37 (describing such an attack).
'. See Laqueur, supra note 8, at 14 (arguing that a computerized, information-
warfare-based attack initiated against the Federal Reserve's main switching terminal in
Culpepper, Virginia would be disastrous to the United States); SCHWARTAU, supra note
7, at 308-10 (describing the spiralling confusion and panic a concerted series of infor-
mation-warfare attacks could cause); see also Michael Wilson, The Precipice Problem:
A Guide to the Destabilization of Western Civilization <http://www.infowar.conV
class_3/class3_3.html-ssi> (visited on Mar. 17, 1997). Wilson describes a concerted cam-
paign which is geared toward catastrophically disrupting critical functions of society
controlled by technology such as phone, power, financial, transportation, communication,
and law enforcement information networks. See id. Wilson concludes that after such an
attack "some things are clear - there will be immediate chaos. [The amount of
damage that will done will total into the trillions; this does not take into account the
long-term economic effects which will not be correctable. The West will be suffering
from near-fatal internal strife .... " Id.
' See BROWNLm, supra note 18, at 13-14 (noting that bi-lateral treaties may
provide evidence of customary international law, but that considerable caution is to be
used in evaluating treaties for this purpose).
" Agreement of the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities, June 12, 1989,
19981
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networks a "dangerous military activity."' 7 By concluding this treaty,
the United States and the Soviet Union recognized the dangers caused by
interference with information networks. The treaty represents an attempt
by the parties to create a framework to mitigate the provocative potential
of various military actions. 5 ' The decision to include disruption of
certain information networks is an important determination deserving of
wider implementation in the international arena.159
C. Information Warfare Differs From Economic Aggression
It has been argued that economic aggression or coercion may consti-
tute a prohibited use of force under Article 2(4)."6° This view requires
that Article 2(4) be interpreted as outlawing any form of coercion threat-
ening fundamental national interests, thus allowing for the inclusion of
actions such as economic coercion.' According to this view, Article
2(4) authorizes a state to use force to protect itself from economic
U.S.- U.S.S.R, 28 I.L.M. 877.
' See id. at 884. Article VI of the treaty dictates,
1. When personnel of the armed forces of one Party, in proximity to personnel
and equipment of the armed forces of the other Party, detect interference with their
command and control networks which could cause harm to them or damage to their
equipment, they may inform the relevant personnel of the armed forces of the other
Party if the they believe the interference is being caused by such personnel and
equipment of the armed forces of the Party.
2. If the personnel of the armed forces of the Party having received such informa-
tion establish that this interference with the command and control networks is being
caused by their activities, they shall take expeditious measures to terminate the interfer-
ence.
Id.
1 See id.
"' The fact that the agreement is limited to disruption of military command and
communications networks does not undercut this argument. See id. At the time the
treaty was enacted, the current conceptualization of information warfare did not exist.
One of the most important elements of this treaty is the determination that information
networks can be targeted for disruption and that such disruptions are provocative and
dangerous. This conclusion certainly also applies to current conceptualizations of
information warfare.
" See Jordan J. Paust & Albert P. Bluastein, The Arab Oil Weapon-A Threat to
International Peace, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 410, 416-17 (1974) (arguing that economic
coercion affected by the Arab oil embargo constituted "force," according to Article
2(4)). See generally JULIUS STONE, CONFLCrT THROUGH CONSENSUS 96-98 (1977) (ar-
guing that while the 1974 U.N. conference on defining aggression did not specifically
include economic aggression, that does not necessarily mean it cannot be included
under certain circumstances).
16 See Tom J. Farer, Political and Economic Coercion in Contemporary Interna-
tional Law, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 405, 408-09 (1985).
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coercion against its interests.'
Economic aggression has been defined as, "economic pressure
'violating [the] sovereignty and economic independence' of another State
and 'threatening the bases of its economic life,' preventing another State
'from exploiting or nationalizing its own natural resources.""' The
1974 oil embargo represents an excellent example of states using econom-
ic means to coerce other states by threatening the bases of their economic
existence.'" Paust and Bluastein provide three reasons why the oil em-
bargo could be viewed as an act of force in violation of Article 2(4)."
The embargo had destructive effects on jobs, balance of payments, and
world-wide trade and potentially threatened the economic survival of
some countries." The oil embargo also threatened the lives of an esti-
mated twenty million people because of increased fertilizer and medical
costs. 67 Finally, the authors argue that the oil embargo directly threat-
ened the military capabilities of some states, notably those of Western
Europe.' 6
However, the general consensus of scholars is that economic coer-
cion, such as sanctions or embargoes, does not violate Article 2(4)."
The supporters of this view point to both historical context and state
practice for support 7° At the time of the drafting of Article 2(4),
" See Paust & Bluastein, supra note 160, at 416 (arguing that the 1974 oil
embargo may have been an act of "economic aggression" of sufficient "intensity,
efficacy, and magnitude as to threaten the security of another state significantly and,
thus, properly justify the exercise of the right of, self-defense").
" See STONE, supra note 160, at 90 (quoting the Soviet Union's 1956 draft defini-
tion of aggression including, additionally, the imposition of an economic blockade by
one state or another).
3 See Paust & Bluastein, supra note 160, at 432 (noting that Japan and Western
Europe were extremely dependent upon the Middle East for their oil).
"6 Id. at 434-37.
" See id. at 434-35 (noting that the oil embargo particularly threatened developing
countries).
'- See id. at 435-37 (noting that virtually all parts of the agriculture industry are
dependent upon oil or electricity).
" See id. 436-38 (showing that although U.S. military readiness would not be
affected by the oil embargo, the embargo could undermine preparedness in countries
such as Germany and the Netherlands).
" See Romana Sadurska, Threats of Force, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 239, 253-54 (1988)
(noting development of a general consensus that Article 2(4) does not prohibit eco-
nomic coercion). See Farer, supra note 161, at 410. But see BELATCHEW ASRAT,
PROHMTON OF FORCE UNDER THE U.N. CHARTER 137 (1991) (arguing that no clear
consensus exists on the prohibition of economic force, and the charter framework
should be flexible enough to include such actions if the need arises).
'"o See Farer, supra note 161, at 410.
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several smaller states attempted to have economic coercion covered by the
Article."" These efforts were convincingly defeated." The United
States has consistently and without legal challenge used various forms of
economic coercion since the Charter's inception." The permissibility of
economic coercion was affirmed by the Arbitral Tribunal which decided
an aviation dispute between the United States and France." The legality
of economic coercion is supported by the important role that such coer-
cion can have in reducing the amount of violence in the international
community. Economic measures reduce the amount of violence in the
international community because they allow states to signal their displea-
sure with each other and give them a non-violent means of influence. 76
These reasons support the conclusion that economic coercion is not pro-
hibited by Article 2(4).
The discussion of economic sanctions is relevant to IW because it
might be possible to view IW as a method of economic coercion. In
describing IW, there has been a focus on certain economic targets" and
the economic havoc 1W could create.7 Thus, superficially an analogy
can be drawn between IW and economic coercion such as the Arab oil
embargo."7 Neither tactic uses the "armed force" involving explosions
and shock waves that Article 2(4) is thought to proscribe." ° Thus, it
could be argued that, like economic coercion, IW does not violate Article
2(4). The significance of this is quite simple, although patently signifi-
171 See id.
172 See id.
" See id. See also MARGARET P. DOXEY, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND INTERNATION-
AL ENFORCEMENT 22-26 (1971) (discussing COCOM and CHINCOM, which were U.S.-
led embargoes of the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and China respectively. These em-
bargoes never experienced any challenges based upon Article 2(4)).
"7 Case Concerning the Air Services Agreement of 27 March 1946 (U.S. v. Fr.), 54
I.L.R. 304 (Arb. Trib. established by the Compromise of 11 July 1978). "If a situation
arises which, in one State's view, results in the violation of an international obligation
by another State, the first State is entitled, within the limits set by the general rules
of international law pertaining to the use of armed force, to affirm its rights through
'counter-measures."' Id. at 337.
" See Sadurska, supra note 169, at 253-54.
176 See id.
" See MOLANDER, supra note 102, at 25 (describing how switching centers and
various stock and mercantile exchanges managed by the Federal Reserve are prime, al-
though difficult, targets for an IW attack).
1n See SCHWARTAU, supra note 7, at 308-10 (claiming that severe economic damage
could be incurred in a concerted IW attack).
,7 See supra notes 164-68.
"8 See BROWNLIE, supra note 18, at 362 (describing the elements of "armed force").
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cant: if IW does not violate Article 2(4), that is, does not constitute an
"armed attack," a State suffering from an 1W attack may not have the
right to retaliate with military force because of the prohibition of the use
of force by Article 2(4).181 However, if IW is viewed as a form of
"armed attack" then a state attacked by 1W clearly would have a right to
respond with its own use of force."
Several aspects separate 1W from economic coercion and cause IW
to merit being specifically prohibited under Article 2(4). The type of
damage IW is capable of creating more resembles an attack by conven-
tional weapons" than economic coercion." 1W can cause real physi-
cal damage, property can be destroyed,'" and people can be killed."e
.. If IW did not violate Article 2(4), the victim state would have the option of
applying various economic counter-measures or engaging in retaliatory IW. However,
these retaliatory measures could prove less than satisfactory, since the pariah states,
such Iraq and Sudan, most likely to engage in IW are already being ineffectively
pressured by numerous sanctions. These states also lack the devolved information
networks to make them vulnerable to retaliatory IW. See ARQuiLLA & RoNFELDT,
supra note 3, at 33-35 (1996).
" If IW is viewed as armed attack, then the victim state will be able to exercise
its right to self-defense. See DiNsTmN, supra note 129, at 175. Dinstein also explains
that self-defense is "a lawful use of force (principally, counter-force), under conditions
prescribed by international law, in response to a previous unlawful use (or, at least a
threat) of force." Id. at 175. Any act of self-defense would be subject to three limi-
tations: necessity (all peaceful measures have been found wanting or would be clearly
futile); proportionality (reasonableness of the counter-force used in response); and imme-
diacy (no undue time-lag between the attack and the counter-force). See id. at 202-03.
Even with these limitations, viewing IW as an armed attack would give the victim state
considerably more flexibility in formulating a response. Considering IW as an "armed
attack" would allow the victim state to respond with conventional weapons. See
Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.CJ. 4 (June 27) (Schwebel,
J., dissenting) (noting that "measures taken in self-defense, to be proportional, need not
mirror offensive measures of the aggressor and arguably that "since the United Nations
Charter came into force, it indicates that self-defense, individual and collective, may
carry the combat to the source of the aggression, whether direct or indirect"). This is
important because conventional force may offer the only effective mechanism to deter
or reply to IW. See ARQUILA & RONFELDT, supra note 3, at 33-35. (noting the
asymmetrical nature of IW); International Terrorism, supra note 12 (testimony of
Casper Weinberger, Former Secretary of Defense) (noting that the 1986 air strikes on
Libya deterred future Libyan aggression).
" See generally SCHWARTAU, supra note 7, at 308-10 (describing the potential im-
pact of an 1W attack).
"' See, e.g., Paust & Bluastein, supra note 160, at 426-28 (describing the par-
ticipants and objectives of the 1974 oil embargo).
" See DEP'T. OF THE AIR FORCE, INFORMATION WARFARE, supra note 33, at 11.
' See Costantini, supra note 37 (describing how a disgruntled employee incapaci-
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Additionally, the damage dealt by IW can be much more accurately
targeted than the effects of economic coercion.'87 The chronology of IW
more closely resembles an armed attack' than an attack by economic
measures. 9 The time it takes for IW to make its impact is measured in
minutes and hours,"9 while an embargo or boycott takes weeks or
months to have an impact. 9' The rapid nature of an IW attack means
that a state is restricted in institute measures, such as rationing, to miti-
gate the impact of the attack..
Finally and most significantly, IW causes a loss of control of a
fundamentally different nature than that which occurs when a state is
targeted by economic coercion. Economic coercion involves the use of
market forces against the victim, typically by decreasing the -supply of an
important commodity." IW, in contrast, involves the destruction of the
marketplace, by preventing buyers and sellers from communicating with
each other or erasing records of transactions.'93 This distinction is criti-
cal because some IW attacks will only target the financial infrastructure
of a country.'94 A series of IW attacks on a country's major banks,
draining them of their assets, would cause a major panic because the
population of the country would have no chance to prepare for the loss
of their financial base. 9 Even if the IW attack did not cause immediate
tated an emergency alert network putting thousands at risk). See also LEE, supra note
34, at 11.
" See generally SCHWARTAU, supra note 7, at 308-10 (describing an attack
involving the destruction or incapacitation of several distinct networks, resulting in the
logical inference that IW efforts can focus on a single network).
" See generally id. at 296-310 (describing militaristic qualities of such an attack
and inferring the speed with which such an attack could take place). 1W occurs as
rapidly as the computers that are the targets can process information or as quickly as
the networks and machines relying on these computers stop to function when the com-
puter breaks down. For some things, such as an airborne plane, impact would be
immediate, whereas other networks such as Automatic Teller Machine networks might
experience some lag between shut down and the time banks realize what has happened.
19 See Paust & Bluastein, supra note 160, 410-11 (describing how roughly four
months passed (from October of 1973 to February of 1974) before the full impact of
the oil embargo was felt).
19 See Wilson, supra note 154 (noting that 1W attacks could "destroy the world's
currency, capital and equity markets in a matter of minutes").
191 See Paust & Bluastein, supra note 160, at 434-35.
19 See id. at 432 (describing the level of dependence of Japan and Europe on oil
imported from the Middle East).
193 See generally SCHWARTAU, supra note 7, at 308-10 (describing hypothetical meth-
ods which could be employed in an IW attack).
4 See Paust & Blaustein, supra note 160, at 91 (describing attacks on banks and
stock exchanges and the widespread panic and chaos such attacks could create).
" Albania's recent experiences with rapidly collapsing pyramid schemes in which
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anarchy, it could lead to a serious degradation of that country's financial
position relative to the rest of the world and cause long-term damage to
the country's well-being."9 The panic caused by the IW and the cata-
strophic impact attacks on financial resources alone could support the
conclusion that an 1W attack on a country's financial system should be
viewed as a violation of Article 2(4).
D. Establishing Jurisdiction in Information Warfare Cases-Why It Does
Not Matter
Establishing where events occur in cyberspace is important for
scholars dealing with conflicts of law."9 However, when the question
revolves around a conflict among states, rather than among individuals,
the choice of law questions become moot because states can only turn to
international law to resolve their disputes.'98 Although disputes and
questions arise about the proper sources of international law, there is no
dispute that a single international legal system exists.' The question of
whether a country suffered from an attack violating Article 2(4) is a
a significant number of the population had invested their savings provides an empirical
example of the resulting chaos that can erupt when a country's financial system col-
lapses. See Bad to Worse, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 15, 1997, at 48,51 (describing the
relationship between the collapse of investment schemes and the government's inability
to respond to its citizen's resulting loss of savings, as being the direct cause of anar-
chy in Albania).
'"' See Wilson, supra note 154 (describing the impact of IW on the world's
financial markets). The 1994 Mexican peso collapse is illustrative of the type of impact
a large capital flight can have on a country. Without a massive bailout loan from the
United States and the IMF, it is generally believed the Mexican financial structure
would have totally collapsed, and the rest of Mexico would soon have followed. IW
attacks could have even more potent effects by causing banks and stock markets to
collapse simultaneously, thereby hindering or diverting any aid that other countries
might attempt to provide. See id.
"9 See Matthew R. Burmstein, Note, Conflicts on the Net: Choices of Law in
Transnational Cyberspace, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 75, 78 n.6 (1996) (quoting
Professor Dan L. Burk as describing jurisdictional issues as "the major issue for the
net").
"' See BRowNLm, supra note 18, at 58-59 (noting that states are subjects of
international law).
'99 Although questions may arise as to whether a particular dispute is more properly
responded to via GATr, the U.N. Security Council, or the International Court of
Justice, there is no question of these groups applying different law. Contrast this with
a wide variety of legal systems existing across 145 states and within them, there are
countries organized as federations. Hundreds of national and sub-national jurisdictions
exist each with their own law. The establishment of location and jurisdiction becomes
much more important when substantive questions rest on this outcome.
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question which will be addressed by either the International Court of
Justice 0 or the United Nations Security Council. 1 Either decision-
making body will apply Article 2(4), and thus parties will have no
incentive to forum shop by attempting to characterize the location of the
IW as having occurred in a jurisdiction with favorable law.
The test for where an IW attack occurs should be as expansive as
possible. There is a rationale for wanting as many countries involved as
possible. The more countries damaged by the attack, the greater the
probability one of them will respond to the attack. The international
community can maximize the number of countries injured by 1W attacks
by allowing countries to apply the "passive personality" principle" to
their information networks. 3 The sweeping jurisdiction created by the
passive personality principle has been consistently rejected by the interna-
tional community.' However, when discussing conflicts between states,
the principle of passive personality is implicitly applied because states are
made up of their citizens.' Thus, it is reasonable for states to use the
See BROWNLIE, supra note 18, at 718-20 (discussing how the International Court
of Justice has jurisdiction over "contentious cases between states").
"o See Schachter, supra note 140, at 453 (noting the Security Council passed Reso-
lution 660 which implicitly held that a violation of Article 2(4) had occurred).
See LEA BRILMAYER, CONFuCrs OF LAws 963 (4th. ed. 1995). "This principle
authorizes states to assert jurisdiction over offenses committed against their citizens
abroad. It recognizes that each state has a legitimate interest in protecting the safety of
its citizens when they journey outside national boundaries." Id.
3 For instance, if a country were to attack Ireland's telephone system, that country
may well face retaliatory measures from a number of countries including Germany, the
United States, and the United Kingdom, as well as from the Irish Government These
countries have companies conducting important, albeit mundane, work in Ireland
involving the bookkeeping of billions of dollars worth of investment funds. See The
Irish Financial Industry: Europe's Back Office, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 16, 1996, at 83
(describing Ireland's flourishing financial-services industry). Both the companies and
their financial networks are vulnerable to an information warfare attack brought against
Ireland's telephone system, and if such an attack were to occur, each of the four
named countries would be justified in retaliating.
2' See REsTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402. The Restate-
ment holds that "[A] state does not have jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law
attaching legal consequence to the conduct of an alien outside its territory merely on
the ground that the conduct affects one of its nationals."
See Christopher Greenwood, International Law and the United States' Air
Operation Against Libya, 89 W. VA. L. REV. 933, 941 (1987) (arguing that "since
population is one of the attributes of statehood, an attack upon at state's population
would seem to be just as much an attack on that state as would an attack upon its
territory"); see also DINSTEIN, supra note 129, at 195 (providing several examples of
armed attacks against Utopia, which do not occur in Utopian territory: "Arcadian troops
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passive personality principle when establishing jurisdiction to respond to
an 1W attack.
The principle of "collective self-defence" also helps to alleviate
concerns about jurisdiction and spacial location when confronting IW.'
Collective self-defense moots the idea of jurisdiction because it does not
matter where the attack creates its impact, under collective self-defense
any state can intervene to defend any state victimized by an attack. The
establishment of a physical location for an attack becomes irrelevant as
well because again any state can aid a state which has been illegally
attacked.o
V. CONCLUSION
A state's use of information warfare against the information networks
of another state should be viewed as violating Article 2(4) of the U.N.
Charter. IW has the potential to inflict catastrophic damage to society and
unilateral efforts to respond to it will not be successful. This potential
harm has caused many countries to attempt to formulate national policy
in response to it. These policies ignore the international character of 1W
and the existing international legal structures which could be used to
check 1W. The transnational nature of IW creates a situation in which
concerted international efforts will be required to prevent the use of this
new weapon.
Article 2(4) provides the best mechanism for the international
community to respond to IW. Article 2(4) is flexible enough to encom-
pass this new type of weapon. Article 2(4) also has the legitimacy within
the international community to make it a solid basis for articulating a
new law. Article 2(4) and Article 51 of the charter work together to
codify the rights of individual and collective self-defense. The ability of
states to exercise these powers in response to an IW attack provides a
assault Utopian personnel stationed by consent within the territory of Numidia";
"Arcadian battleship sinks a Utopian vessel on the high seas"; "[Florce is used by
Arcadia against Utopian installations legitimately situated within Arcadian territory ..
."). All of these examples show situations in which a state suffers an armed attack
without experiencing any violation of its territorial integrity. See id.
' See DINSTEIN, supra note 129, at 251 (noting that the idea of collective self-de-
fense is codified in the U.N. Charter at Article 51). Collective self-defense may occur
spontaneously as an unplanned response to an armed attack, or it may be planned in
advance by way of a treaty or some other similar mechanism. See id. Schachter
provides the clearest definition when he notes, "any state may come to the aid of a
state that has been illegally attacked." Schachter, supra note 141, at 457.
' But see DINSTEIN, supra note 129, at 267 (explaining that the caveats regarding
necessity, proportionality, and immediacy that govern the exercise of self-defense also
apply to cases of collective self-defense).
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critical deterrent element. Article 2(4) allows the international community
to condemn 1W and preserve the communities right to strike back against
those who employ IW. This combination provides the most effective
means of discouraging states from using this weapon.
